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5. Clues to the existence of at least one global interception system
(Missing parts to be submitted after visit to USA)
5.1. Why is it necessary to work on the basis of clues?
It is only natural that secret services do not disclose details of their work. Consequently there
is, at least officially, no statement by the foreign intelligence services of the ECHELON states
that they work together to operate a global interception system. The existence of such a
system thus needs to be proved by gathering as many clues as possible, thereby building up a
convincing body of evidence.
The trail of clues which constitutes evidence of this kind is made up of three elements:
- evidence that the foreign intelligence services in the ECHELON states intercept
private and business communications;
- evidence that interception stations operated by the ECHELON states are to be found in
the parts of the world where they would be needed in the light of the technical
requirements of the civilian satellite communication system;
- evidence that there is a closer than usual association between the intelligence services
of these states. For the purposes of proving the existence of such an association, it is
irrelevant whether this extends to the acceptance from partners of applications for the
interception of messages which are then forwarded to them in the form of unevaluated
raw material. This question is only relevant when investigating the hierarchies within
such an interception association.
5.1.1. Evidence of interception activity on the part of foreign intelligence services
At least in democracies, intelligence services work on the basis of laws which define their
purpose and/or powers. It is thus easy to prove that in many of these countries foreign
intelligence services exist which intercept civilian communications. This is true of the five
ECHELON states, which all operate such services. There is no need for specific additional
proof that any of these states intercept communications entering and leaving their territory.
Satellite communications also permit some intelligence communications intended for
recipients abroad to be intercepted from the country s own territory. In none of the five
ECHELON states is there any legal impediment to intelligence services doing this. The logic
underlying the method for the strategic monitoring of foreign communications, and its at least
partly overtly acknowledged purpose, make it practically certain that the intelligence services
do in fact use it to that end.1
5.1.2. Evidence for the existence of stations in the necessary geographical areas
The only restriction on the attempt to build up worldwide monitoring of satellite
communications arises from the technical constraints imposed by these communications
themselves. There is no place from which all satellite communications can be intercepted (see
1
Your rapporteur has evidence that this is the case. Source protected.
DT\437638EN.doc 34/92 PE 300.153
EN
point 4).
It would be possible for a worldwide interception system to be constructed, subject to three
conditions:
- the operator has national territory of its own in all the necessary parts of the world;
- the operator has, in all the necessary parts of the world, either national territory of its
own or a right of access entitling it to operate or share the use of stations;
- the operator is a group of states which has formed an intelligence association and
operates the system in the necessary parts of the world.
None of the ECHELON states would be able to operate a global system on its own. The USA
has, at least formally, no colonies. Canada, Australia and New Zealand also have no territory
outside the narrower confines of their countries, and the UK would also not be able to operate
a global interception system on its own (see Chapter 6).
5.1.3. Evidence of a close intelligence association
On the other hand it has not been disclosed whether and to what extent the ECHELON states
cooperate with one another in the intelligence field. Normally cooperation between
intelligence services takes place bilaterally and on the basis of an exchange of evaluated
material. A multilateral union is in itself something very unusual; if one adds to this the
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