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ence). The Global Hawk vehicle in particular has proved to be an
extremely versatile, long-endurance system, simultaneously collect-
ing imagery, signals intelligence, and other types of intelligence dur-
ing sorties lasting several times the length of a typical manned aircraft
flight.23 The ability to field a sufficient number of Predators and
Global Hawks with the requisite sensor payloads and connectivity
appears indispensable in satisfying emerging global awareness needs.
Space systems will continue to play a central part in global aware-
ness, providing a unique vantage point from which sensors can
penetrate areas otherwise closed to U.S. collection assets. While it is
not feasible to discuss the various reconnaissance satellites that the
Air Force is developing or operating in concert with the National
Reconnaissance Office, two other spacecraft types look likely to make
major contributions to global awareness for decades to come. First,
the space-based infrared system replacing Cold War missile warning
satellites will greatly increase the quantity and quality of intelligence
available to strategic and tactical users in the infrared portion of
the spectrum; coupled with a ground network already in operation
for fusing and rapidly disseminating information from multiple
sources, the new constellation will support nuclear deterrence,
missile defense, tactical military operations, and intelligence commu-
nity needs. Second, space radar has the potential to provide a leap
in reconnaissance capabilities comparable to that which global
AGE AND INDIFFERENCE ERODE U.S. AIR POWER 75
positioning provided for navigation, enabling continuous tracking
and imagery of moving targets anywhere on the earth s surface.24
Global Mobility. The future capacity of U.S. combat forces to deploy
rapidly will be shaped by many factors, including the pre-positioning
of equipment in likely theaters of operation, the availability of sealift,
and the success of the Army in fielding lighter brigade combat teams.
For the Air Force, though, the future of mobility comes down largely
to the fate of three programs: the C-17 strategic airlifter, the C-130J
tactical airlifter, and the proposed successor to the KC-135 tanker. At
present, the service plans to terminate production of both the C-17
and C-130J in the near future, while beginning the long-delayed
recapitalization of its Cold War tanker fleet. However, the decision to
terminate airlift programs was grounded in a mobility requirements
study that did not project airlift needs beyond 2012. Because lift
requirements could grow considerably in later years, Army and Air
Force leaders are skeptical about the wisdom of terminating produc-
tion of the C-17 and C-130J. Unfortunately, funding is not currently
available to continue airlift production while also beginning replace-
ment of tankers.
The planned airlift fleet will consist of 111 giant C-5 cargo planes,
180 C-17s, and over 500 C-130s in a range of configurations. The
jet-powered C-5s and C-17s were designed mainly for intertheater
missions, while the propeller-driven C-130s were built mainly for
intratheater missions. However, this distinction between strategic
and tactical airlift is being blurred somewhat by the longer range
and greater carrying capacity of the C-130 J variant. Although the
venerable C-5 still has decades of service life remaining, changes in
the threat, in operating concepts, and in airlift technology make the
C-17 and C-130 more suitable for many missions. In addition, the
C-5 has suffered from chronically low mission-capable rates, a prob-
lem the Air Force hopes to correct by installing new engines and elec-
tronics on the planes. When the demands of the global war on terror
are combined with the advanced age of many C-130s in the field
today, it is hard to see the wisdom of terminating either active airlift
line. Not only is the C-17 essential to the success of the Army s future
76 OF MEN AND MATERIEL
combat plans, but the C-130 is the logical candidate to fill a gap in
short-hop cargo-carrying capacity. The Air Force therefore must find
the money to keep both the C-17 and C-130J production lines active,
while also upgrading the C-5 fleet.25
All of this might be feasible within projected funding limits if the
Air Force were not determined to begin replacing its fleet of
Eisenhower- and Kennedy-era aerial refueling tankers. But once that
burden is added to the budget, it is clear only additional money out-
side the current program will make it possible to meet all future
mobility requirements. KC-135s represent about 90 percent of the
Air Force s refueling fleet, and the oldest of them are of doubtful air-
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